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Abstract
An alternative theoretical setting is presented to characterise the money demand
and the monetary equilibrium. Two main hypotheses are stated that contradict
the assumptions normally sustained by scholars and policy-makers: national output
is assumed to be a random variable, and people are supposed to face borrowing
restrictions in capital markets. After the model of James Tobin, 1958, the demand
for balances is determined in order to maximise the expected return of a certain
portfolio combining risk and cash holdings. Unlike the model of Tobin, the prices
of the underlying exposures are established in actuarial terms. Then the efficacy of
monetary policy is explicitly affected by the expected return and the volatility of the
series of percentage returns of the national output.
Key words: Monetary equilibrium; Money demand; Liquidity-preference; Mon-
etary policy; Quantity theory.
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1 Introduction
People demand money to execute transactions, to fund potential investment opportuni-
ties, and to prevent themselves from suffering unexpected losses. These are respectively
known as the transactions, the speculative and the precautionary motives for holding
money. According to the liquidity-preference proposition (Keynes, 1936), the sum of the
cash balances held by the public in the economy (or simply, the money demand of the
economy) is in direct proportion to the level of national income and inversely related to
the return offered by a certain class of money substitutes, in such a way that:
L(r) = Y · λ(r) = P y · λ(r) with dλ(r)
dr
< 0 (1)
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where P denotes the level of prices, and where Y and y respectively denote the levels
of nominal and real income. Recall that nominal magnitudes represent flows expressed
in monetary units, while real quantities are expressed in terms of the goods and services
that money can purchase. Within this context, the discount factor λ(r) represents the
preference for liquidity of the economy.
The importance attached to the liquidity-preference proposition arises due to the role
it plays in the determination of the monetary equilibrium and the implications to the
conduction of monetary policy. Indeed, at equilibrium, the total demand for cash holdings
must equilise the total amount or stock of moneyM supplied by the monetary authority:1
M = Y · λ(r) = P y · λ(r) with dλ(r)
dr
< 0 (2)
Hence any change in the money stock induces a variation in any of the variables deter-
mining the money demand (P , y or r) in order to reestablish the monetary equilibrium.
Accordingly, if the level of prices and real output were pegged to some determined paths
of variation (respectively corresponded to some determined rates of inflation and growth),
the monetary authority would be able to provide, in principle, the amount of money that
is consistent (in the sense that Equation 2 is satisfied) with some target level of the interest
rate — corresponded to some desired level of economic activity.2
The efficacy of the mechanism depends, however, on how much of the response of
the economy is performed through adjustments in the level of prices, and how much is
performed by modifying the preference for liquidity. In order to give a precise answer to
this question, some assumption about the sensibility of the liquidity-preference function
with respect to the interest rate must be adopted. This issue, which dominated the
economic debate during the 1960s, led to a fierce and long-term controversy between
keynesians and monetarists.3
Indeed, if (as assumed by pure keynesians) the demand for money were perfectly elastic
(in other words, if individuals were satisfied at a single level of the interest rate) then the
amount of money could vary while both the levels of nominal income and interest rates
1The money supply is traditionally related to a class of narrow money denoted as M1, which mostly
contains currency held by non-banking institutions and householders. Other monetary aggregates areM2,
which includes small-denomination time deposits and retail mutual funds, and M3, which adds mutual
funds, repurchase agreements and large-denomination time deposits.
2The monetary mechanism is a topic discussed at least to some extent in any manual ofmacroeconomics
or financial economics nowadays. See e.g. Romer, 1996, Blanchard, 2005, and Howells and Bain, 2005.
Siven, 2006, provides a historical survey on the subject. Edwards and Sinzdak, 1997, describes in details
the way monetary policy is implemented by the Federal Reserve.
3See Keynes, 1936, 1937a and 1937b, Friedman, 1966, 1968, 1970 and 1971, Modigliani, 1963 and 1977,
Tobin, 1972, 1981, 1982 and 1993, and Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987, 1991 and 1993. Broadly speaking,
the monetary controversy can be related to the question of how rapidly monetary interventions affect
the interest rate the general public have to pay to access to credit, and how effectively these effects are
transmitted to the level of national output. A crucial element of the mechanism is how financial markets
interact with consumers and producers, and how the economy interacts with the rest of the world. See
e.g. Dornbusch and Frenkel, 1973, Dornbusch and Krugman, 1976, Dornbusch, 1977 and 1990, Obstfeld
et al., 1985, Krugman et al., 1985, Stiglitz, 1988, Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, Bernanke and Gertler,
1995, Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997, and also Bernanke and Woodford, 1997.
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remain unchanged. The preference for liquidity is said to be absolute in this situation.4 By
contrast, if (as claimed by pure monetarists) liquidity-preference were non-absolute, every
change in the money stock would affect (at least partially) the level of nominal income,
and then every monetary expansion and every monetary contraction would respectively
stimulate and contract the level of nominal output in the short-run.5
As a matter of fact, a majority of scholars and central bankers assume the demand
for cash balances, or some non-decreasing transformation of it, varies constantly with
respect to the interest rate. Accordingly, log-log and semi-log functional relationships are
normally used in empirical investigations of the money demand.6 Under this assumption,
every variation in the amount of money is proportional to a certain movement of the
interest rate. Then monetary policy can be effectively conducted by adjusting the money
supply to some empirical estimation of the interest rate elasticity.
A strong supposition about the functioning of goods and capital markets is however
implicit in this reasoning. In fact, as stated in Equation 2, the liquidity-preference factor
λ(r) represents the rate at which individuals exchange a unit of cash for a unit of money
invested or consumed in the national output. Therefore, assuming that this coefficient
is a linear function of some transformation of the interest rate implies that people can
always borrow the balance required to fund any given expansion of the national output, or
similarly, they can always lend the amount of money required to justify any given output
contraction. The hypothesis of linearity implies that such operations are scale invariant
— for then the changes in balances and interest rates are proportional to each other —
and hence, that the transactions of goods and financial services are not affected by the
quantities involved in the agreements.
However, output variations reflect changes in consumption and investment habits and
are thereby corresponded to structural economic adjustments — which might affect the
preference for liquidity of individuals. Such adjustments are expected to be more severe
when people do not know with certainty the level that the national output will take in
the near future, or more precisely, when the series of output variations follows the path
of some random variable. Besides, claiming that individuals face no borrowing or lending
restrictions in financial markets — and accordingly, that they can exchange at will their
cash holdings for physical capital or consumption — is not always a realistic assumption
(especially under times of crises).
4Keynes and his disciples claim that firmly convinced investors will necessarily absorb any increment
or reduction of the stock of money without changing their perceptions about the level of interest rates.
Thus if individuals share expectations about the level of the interest rate, variations in the amount of
money must be totally transmitted to the demand for balances, or in other words, the aggregate money
demand must be perfectly elastic (see also Tobin, 1947).
5Any monetary expansion then leads to a new equilibrium involving higher prices for the same quantity,
the higher this response the more inelastic the money demand. In short-terms, production is encouraged
until prices are reestablished to their original levels. In the long-run, new producers enter the market and
existing plants are expanded. Throughout the process, it may take time for output to adjust, but no time
for prices to do so. See Friedman, 1968, 1970 and 1971.
6Such functional expressions can be justified on the grounds of a model of general equilibrium, where
people allocate their funds to cash holdings and consumption. The money demand is derived in this
framework by maximising the utility of a representative agent. See Lucas, 2000, and Holmstrom and
Tirole, 2000.
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An alternative model is proposed in this paper for the characterisation of liquidity-
preference and the monetary equilibrium, which explicitly incorporates such objections.
Consequently, the model is built on the grounds of two fundamental hypotheses. It is
assumed, in the first place, that although individuals do not know with exactitude the level
that income will take in the next period, they can observe the series of percentage output
returns and estimate its parameters with respect to some class of probability distributions.
Secondly, people are supposed to face restrictions when looking for funding in capital
markets, in such a way that in order to suppress the risk implicit in their portfolios, they
are obliged to trade their residual exposures in some market of deposit insurance.
It is possible to prove that an optimal cash balance exists under such circumstances,
determined in order to maximise the expected return of some portfolio containing cash
holdings and a mutual fund delivering random payments. Then an optimal liquidity
principle can be defined, which explicitly depends on the riskiness of national income,
as demonstrated in Sections 3 and 4. A similar approach is followed by James Tobin
(1958) for the characterisation of liquidity-preference. The main features of the model of
Tobin (which is taken as a reference and a comparison basis in the rest of the paper) are
presented in Section 2.
Within this context, as pointed out in Section 5, the stock of money determined by the
central bank is not corresponded to a unique level of the interest rate, as suggested in
classic macroeconomics. Besides, several empirical assumptions regarding the dependence
of the money demand with respect to the interest rate can be theoretically justified in the
alternative model. We then obtain that only under certain circumstances, dependent on
the probability distribution describing the series of output returns, the money demand is
a linear function of the interest rate. Indeed, it is shown in Section 6 that this condition
is violated, in particular, when the series of output returns follows a Gaussian probability
distribution.
More precisely, variations in the expected return and the volatility of the series of output
returns are necessarily followed by adjustments in the preference for liquidity of the
economy when this series follows a Gaussian probability distribution. This means that
if (as certainly confirmed by the empirical evidence) these parameters evolve in time, so
does the demand for money, as well as its sensibility with respect to the interest rate.
Some patterns are possible in particular, when liquidity-preference becomes absolute and
monetary policy is unable to affect the cost of capital.
In consequence, as demonstrated in Section 7, since monetary interventions may well
produce variations in the expected return and the volatility of the series of output re-
turns, monetary policy cannot be effectively executed unless these parameters are also
incorporated into the design. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 The Utility Maximisation Approach
Tobin (1958) proposes a model where liquidity-preference is determined in order to max-
imise the expected utility provided by some portfolio that combines two different kind of
financial products: some risky aggregate exposure (delivering some random payment at
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the maturity date) and a certain non-risky security (which provides some cash flow that
is known with certainty at any moment before the instrument expires). Individual secu-
rities, as well as diversified portfolios and mutual funds, thus belong to the class of risky
assets, while non-risky securities are related to a class of monetary assets, with no risk of
default, which offer some fixed return delivered at the maturity date of the instrument.
Cash holdings and non-risky bonds belong to this class.
In the model of Tobin, risks are uniquely corresponded to probability distributions.
More specifically, individuals are supposed to assess the riskiness of the alternative secu-
rities based on the empirical frequencies of their price returns. The series of price returns
are additionally supposed to follow Gaussian probability distributions.
Accordingly, every risk is completely characterised by a unique pair of expected return
and volatility, in such a way that if the market participants share their expectations
about the future performance of securities, every portfolio is represented by a single pair
of expected return and volatility. Under such conditions, it is possible to prove that the
mean return and the volatility of every hedged or insured portfolio (as we will refer in the
following to every portfolio that combines some risky asset with a certain cash balance)
must be related to each other according to a linear schedule. This realtionship is known
as the capital market line (Sharpe, 1964, Lintner, 1965).
The preferences of decision-makers, on the other hand, are represented by utility func-
tions contingent on the return of the portfolio Z (which satisfy the axioms of Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern, 1944). An indifference curve is thereby determined in the plane
(µZ , σZ), containing all the portfolios that provide some given level of expected utility.
As long as risk-lover decision-makers are always willing to accept a lower expected return
if there is any chance of obtaining additional profits, their indifference curves show nega-
tive slopes. Averse-to-risk decision-makers, on the other hand, do not accept to increase
their exposure to risk unless they are compensated by a greater expected return and
consequently, their indifference curves have positive slopes. Besides, as long as more is
regarded as better, the indifference curves located to the upper left corner of the plane
are related to higher utilities.
Within this theoretical setting, every rational decision-maker chooses the combination
of risk and cash holdings belonging to the market capital line that maximises her or his
expected utility. Such combination is determined at the point of tangency between this
line and the indifference curve representing the individual’s preferences. In this way,
an expression for the preference for liquidity in terms of the risk-free interest rate can
be obtained. Such a tangency point, however, can be only found if the capital market
line has a positive slope, a condition that characterises the preferences of averse-to-risk
individuals. On these grounds, Tobin (1958) regards liquidity-preference as behaviour
towards risk.
However, a fundamental hypothesis required to assure that individuals can always
build such optimal portfolios is that lending and borrowing are allowed at any moment
for a common risk-free interest rate, no matter the amounts involved in the agreements.
Indeed, if these operations were only possible up to some extent, some portfolios in the
capital market line might require of transactions involving amounts that are not available
in the market.
5
The alternative model of equilibrium that will be presented in the following sections
is built on the assumption that capital and securities cannot be traded at will. Under
such circumstances, people are obliged to maintain reserves of capital and to demand
deposit insurance, for these are the only substitutes to debt restructuring. More pre-
cisely, this means that every holder of a risky portfolio must establish an agreement with
some insurance company that obliges the later to pay the excess of loss over the level of
cash holdings — i.e. the expected value of the actual loss minus the cash guarantee or
deductible. The price of providing such a service, as normally stated by actuarial experts,
is equal to the expected value of the residual exposure (it can be actually demonstrated
that this principle satisfies a set of basic mathematical properties and hence, that it can
be regarded as a fair insurance price, see Goovaerts et al., 1984).
As demonstrated in Section 3, an optimal cash balance exists — in the sense that it
maximises the expected value of the insured portfolio — which is strictly based on the
exposition to risk. An optimal liquidity principle can thus be defined on these grounds,
corresponded to the combination of risk and capital preferred by any rational decision-
maker under borrowing restrictions. This principle explicitly extends the method of James
Tobin. Besides, as shown in Section 4, the aggregate preference for liquidity of markets,
economic sectors and the economy as a whole, can then be obtained by simply summing
up the individual components.
3 The Optimal Liquidity Principle
Let the parameter θ denote the state of information of some firm or individual investor
that holds a mutual fund whose percentage return is represented by the random variable
X = ∆Y/Y , where Y denotes the level of income of the fund. Because of the precautionary
motive for holding money, a guarantee L is maintained until maturity in order to avoid
bankruptcy, whose magnitude, on account of the transactions motive, is expressed as a
proportion λ of the level of income, i.e. L = Y · λ. In the following, this surplus will be
treated as an additional liability that induces the cost r0 · L.
The total payment delivered by the hedged or insured portfolio (which combines the
risky fund X and the guarantee L) at maturity is then contingent on the realisation of
the risky claim X:
Y · Z = Y · (X − λ)− r0 · L if X > λ
Y · Z = Y · (X + λ)− r0 · L if X < −λ
Y · Z = 0 if − λ ≤ X ≤ λ
Therefore, the expected return Z (per unit of income) of the insured portfolio can be
expressed in the following way:
Eθ[Z] = Eθ [(X − λ)+]− Eθ [(X + λ)−]− r0 · λ (3)
where (X−λ)+ = max(0,X −λ) and (X+λ)− = −min(0,X +λ) respectively represent
the surplus and the excess of loss with respect to the cash stock. From the actuarial
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point of view, the terms Eθ[(X − λ)+] and Eθ[(X + λ)−] represent the prices at which
the underlying exposures should be transacted in some insurance market free of arbitrage
(see Goovaerts et al., 1984, Venter, 1991, Wang et al., 1997, and Wang, 2002).7
Within this context, the expected return Eθ[Z] represents the fair price of the portfolio
Z when capital and insurance markets are found at equilibrium (see Mierzejewski, 2008).
Hence, as implied by Equation 3, the market value of the insured portfolio certainly
depends on the proportion of funds λ invested on cash reserves. We can then postulate
that rational decision-makers choose the proportion λ in order to maximise the expected
return Eθ[Z], for in this way they maximise the market valorisation of their portfolios.
In order to explicitly characterise the optimal cash-to-risk proportion λ, the distorted
expectation operator Eθ[·] will be related in the following to the proportional hazards
transformation,8 which is defined as:
Eθ[X] =
∫
x dFθ,X(x) =
∫
Tθ,X(x) dx with Tθ,X(x) := TX(x)
1
θ ∀x (4)
where Fθ,X(x) = Pθ{X ≤ x} and Tθ,X(x) = Pθ{X > x} respectively denote the distorted
cumulative and the distorted tail probability distribution functions, with Fθ,X(x) = 1 −
Tθ,X(x), ∀x. Then the distorted expectation operator is overestimated when θ > 1,
and underestimated when θ < 1, in such a way that these cases can be respectively
corresponded to the behaviour of risk-averse and risk-lover decision-makers.
Applying Lagrange optimisation, implies that the optimal proportion λ∗ (which max-
imises the criterion of Equation 3) is determined at the point where the derivative of
Eθ[Z] with respect to λ is equal to zero:
9
dEθ [(X − λ∗)+]
dλ
− dEθ [(X + λ
∗)−]
dλ
− r0 = −Tθ,X(λ∗) + Fθ,X(−λ∗)− r0 = 0
Since Fθ,X(−λ) = Pθ{X ≤ −λ} = Pθ{−X > λ} = Tθ,−X(λ), ∀λ, the following equivalent
characterisation is obtained:
Tθ,−X(λ
∗)− Tθ,X(λ∗) = r0 (5)
7Froot et al., 1993, propose a similar model to characterise the optimal demand for capital. Unlike
the model presented in this paper, Froot et al. propose to add (and do not multiply) some random
perturbation to the income of the portfolio. Besides, they simultaneously maximise over the levels of
capital and investment. See also Froot and Stein, 1998, and Froot, 2007.
8So called since it is obtained by imposing a safety margin to the hazard rate hX(x) := dln TX(x)/dx
in a multiplicative fashion: hθ,X (x) = (1/θ) · hX(x), with θ > 0. See Wang, 1995
9Applying the Leibnitz’s rule:
d
dy
Z v(y)
u(y)
H(y, x)dx =
Z v(y)
u(y)
∂H(y, x)
∂y
dx+H (y, v(y)) ·
dv(y)
dy
−H (y, u(y)) ·
du(y)
dy
the relationship is obtained by noticing that, from Equation 4, the following expressions are respectively
obtained for the expected surplus and the expected excess of loss: Eθ [(X − λ)+] =
R
∞
λ
(x − λ) dFθ,X(x)
and Eθ [(X + λ)−] = −
R
−λ
−∞
(x+ λ) dFθ,X(x).
7
The rational liquidity demand is thus determined in such a way that the marginal gain
minus the marginal loss on capital (i.e. the instantaneous benefit of liquidity) equals the
marginal return of the sure investment. Within this context, the optimal proportion of
cash is corresponded to an optimal exchange of a sure return and a flow of probability,
and it is the mass accumulated in the tails of the distribution what matters.
However, for the market price of the insured portfolio to be characterised by the ex-
pected return Eθ[Z] defined in Equation 3, individuals must be able to sell their surpluses
at the price Eθ[(X −λ)+], so that the benefit they have to resign (in average) for holding
the proportion of capital λ is equal to:
rθ,X(λ) =
Eθ[X+]− Eθ [(X − λ)+]
λ
⇔ Eθ [(X − λ)+] = Eθ[X+]− rθ,X(λ) · λ (6)
Combining Equations 3 and 6:
Eθ[Z] = Eθ [X+]− Eθ [(X + λ)−]− (r0 + rθ,X(λ)) · λ (7)
In this context, the return rθ,X(λ) can be interpreted as an extra premium paid for keeping
the balance L = Y ·λ as a cash stock, instead of investing it in the mutual fund X. Notice
that the premium rθ,X(λ) determines the cost of capital as perceived by the holders of
the insured portfolio.
But as we have assumed that individuals borrow the cash balance L in some open
market of capital, the cost of capital should rather reflect the perceptions of lenders.
Then consider that debt is implemented by issuing a bond promising to pay a certain
interest rate r at maturity. As long as markets regard such instruments as riskier than the
risk-free security, the issuers of the bond have to offer some return higher than the risk-
free interest rate in order to make it attractive to investors. Hence the condition r > r0
must be satisfied. On the other hand, the bond issuers are not willing to pay a premium
greater than rθ,X(λ), for then the alternative of providing these founds themselves (whose
cost is measured by the premium rθ,X(λ)) would be cheaper. Hence, also the condition
r ≤ r0 + rθ,X(λ) must hold.
Provided that the previous conditions are satisfied, the cost of capital r must be deter-
mined by the credit quality of borrowers. Consequently, it can be only affected by events
that change the perception of investors about the willingness and capability to pay of
the bond issuers. It can then be assumed as constant in practice, as long as the issuers
of bonds do not drastically change their capital structures — i.e. as long as they do not
drastically modify the proportions of reserves in their portfolios.10
10According to Billet and Garfinkel, 2004, such premiums depend explicitly on the difference between
the costs of internal and external financing, and thereby reflect the degree of financial flexibility of the
institution. Thus, institutions with greater flexibility have access to cheaper funding sources, have greater
market values and carry less cash holdings. Kashyap and Stein, 1995 and 2000, analyse the effects of
monetary policy over financial decisions under such circumstances. Kisgen, 2006, investigates to what
extent credit ratings affect capital decisions. See also Faulkender and Wang, 2006, and Gamba and
Triantis, 2008.
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Replacing the return r in the place of (r0 + rθ,X(λ)) in Equation 7, the following
expression is obtained for the expected percentage income:
Eθ[Z] = Eθ [X+]− Eθ [(X + λ)−]− r · λ (8)
Applying Lagrange optimisation, we obtain:
−d Eθ [(X + λ
∗)−]
dλ
− r = Tθ,−X(λ∗)− r = [ T−X(λ∗) ]
1
θ − r = 0
Therefore, investors stop demanding money at the level at which the marginal expected
gain in solvency equals its opportunity cost. The optimal liquidity principle is thereby
given by:
λθ,X(r) = T
−1
θ,−X(r) = T
−1
−X
(
rθ
)
(9)
From this expression, the optimal demand for cash balances always follows a non-increasing
and (as long as the underlying probability distribution is continuous) continuous path,
whatever the kind of risks and distortions, because the tail probability function, and
hence its inverse, are always non-increasing functions of their arguments. The minimum
and maximum levels of surplus are respectively demanded when r ≥ 1 and r ≤ 0. Be-
sides, averse-to-risk and risk-lover individuals (respectively characterised by θ > 1 and
θ < 1) systematically demand higher and lower amounts of cash holdings — for they
respectively under- and over-estimates the cost of capital.
The functional expression of Equation 9 has been already suggested by Dhaene et
al., 2003, and Goovaerts et al., 2005, as a rule of capital allocation within financial
institutions. They emphasise that this rule establishes a compromise between the cost of
capital and solvency requirements, and hence, that it provides a clear economical meaning
for companies that have to handle with bankruptcy costs and market imperfections.
I have additionally proved (Mierzejewski, 2006 and 2008) that this approach naturally
extends the model of deposit insurance of Robert Merton (1974, 1978 and 1997), which
is derived under the assumption that continuous rebalancing is possible. Merton shows
that in this case the market value of any such a policy is equal to the price of a put option
on the value of the underlying claim. In the presence of borrowing restrictions, however,
individuals are not always able to perform the market operations required to suppress the
risk implicit in their option contracts. Demanding risk capital up to the level determined
by Equation 9 is the rational alternative to hedging under such circumstances, which
implies that an option contract is substituted by an insurance policy — or more generally,
that an instrument from financial economics is replaced by a tool from actuarial practice.
In conclusion, the optimal liquidity principle presented in this section is explicitly con-
nected to a particular strategy followed by rational decision-makers due to precautionary
motives — in order to avoid insolvency. Hence the principle can be used to describe
the microscopic structure of some market of cash balances. A basis is thus provided to
characterise the aggregate balance demanded in some industry or economic sector, and
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eventually, the money demand of the economy. This will be the topic treated in the
following section.
4 The Aggregate Liquidity Principle
The aggregate liquidity-preference of some industry or economic sector will be now char-
acterised, where each firm can borrow at a single interest rate r. As stated in the previous
section, such rate depends on the credit quality of borrowers and is supposed to remain
unchanged as long as firms do not drastically alter their capital structures. In other
words, firms are supposed to remain in the same credit class (i.e. the return at which
they can borrow in the market is supposed to remain the same) as long as their exposure
to risk and the proportion of reserves in their portfolios are kept more or less invariant.
Let us assume that firms hold securities and combinations of securities (or are in-
volved in venture projects) producing capital returns represented by the random variables
X1, . . . ,Xn. Let the levels of income and the liquidity-preference functions corresponding
to each of the funds be respectively denoted as Y1, . . . , Yn and λ1(r), . . . , λn(r). The total
surplus accumulated in the industry is then equal to:
Y · λ(r) =
n∑
i=1
Yi · λi(r) with Y =
n∑
i=1
Yi
where Y and λ(r) respectively denote the level of income and the preference for liquidity
accumulated in the industry. Dividing by Y we obtain that:
λ(r) =
n∑
i=1
ωi · λi(r) with ωi = Yi
Y
∀i and
n∑
i=1
ωi = 1 (10)
Accordingly, at any level of the interest rate, the liquidity-preference of the industry
is equal to the sum of the liquidity-preferences of the different firms weighted by their
relative magnitudes in terms of the levels of income.
Let us examine the case when individuals choose their balances according to the liq-
uidity principle of Equation 9 and share expectations about the probability distributions
describing risks — i.e. they agree on the informational type θ. Then the aggregate surplus
must be equal to the sum of the distorted quantiles of the individual exposures:
λ(r) =
n∑
i=1
ωi · T−1θ,−Xi(r) with ωi =
Yi
Y
,
n∑
i=1
ωi = 1
Now define:
λi = ωi · T−1θ,−Xi(r)
⇔ r = Tθ,−Xi
(
λi
ωi
)
= Pθ
{
−Xi > λiωi
}
= Pθ {−ωi ·Xi > λi}
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=⇒ λi = T−1θ,−ωi·Xi(r)
Hence the contributions of firms and individuals to the aggregate liquidity-preference can
be equivalently expressed as the optimal principles corresponded to the weighted capital
returns ω1 ·X1, · · · , ωn ·Xn:
λ(r) =
n∑
i=1
T−1θ,−ωi·Xi(r)
Therefore, for the aggregate liquidity-preference to be expressed as the quantile of the
aggregate capital P&L, we must necessarily impose the sum of the quantiles of the
underlying risks to be equal to the quantile of the aggregate exposure.
In fact, as demonstrated by Dhaene et al. (2002), the property of the sum of the
quantiles mathematically characterises the comonotonic dependence structure. A random
vector (Xc1 , . . . ,X
c
n) is said to be comonotonic if a random variable ζ exists, as well as a
set of non-decreasing functions h1, . . . , hn, such that the realisation of any joint event is
entirely determined by ζ, i.e.:
(Xc1, . . . ,X
c
n) = (h1(ζ), . . . , hn(ζ))
Hence the realisation of any joint event is uniquely related to some event contingent on
the single exposure ζ. Besides, since the functions h1, . . . , hn are all non-decreasing, all
the components of the random vector (Xc1 , . . . ,X
c
n) move in the same direction. On these
grounds, it is said that comonotonicity characterises an extreme case of dependence, when
no benefit can be obtained from diversification.
Let (Xc1, . . . ,X
c
n) denote the random vector described by the same marginal probability
distributions as (ω1 ·X1, . . . , ωn ·Xn) and let Xc = Xc1+ . . .+Xcn = ω1 ·X1+ . . .+ωn ·Xn
denote the comonotonic aggregate (or comonotonic sum) of the individual capital returns.
Then the quantile T−1θ,−Xc of the comonotonic sum is equal to the sum of the quantiles
of the weighted exposures (ω1 · X1, . . . , ωn · Xn), in such a way that the preference for
liquidity of the economy can be written as:
λ(r) = T−1θ,−Xc(r) =
n∑
i=1
T−1θ,−ωi·Xi(r) with X
c =
n∑
i=1
ωi ·Xi (11)
The comonotonic aggregate Xc thereby characterises the aggregate liquidity-preference
in economies where individuals rely on the optimal liquidity principle of Equation 9.
If individuals differ in their expectations, the aggregate money demand is given by:
λ(r) = T−1θ1,...,θn,−Xc(r) =
n∑
i=1
T−1θi,−ωi·Xi(r) =
n∑
i=1
T−1−ωi·Xi
(
rθi
)
(12)
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where θ1, . . . , θn denote the different informational types and Tθ1,..., θn,−Xc = (
∑n
i=1
T−1θi,−ωi·Xi
)−1
denotes the distribution function of the comonotonic sum when the marginal
distributions are given by Tθ1,−ω1·X1 , . . . , Tθn,−ωn·Xn .
Comparing Equations 11 and 12, we observe that there is no formal difference be-
tween assuming equal and differing expectations: in both cases, the aggregate liquidity-
preference is determined by the quantile function of the probability distribution of the
sum of the underlying exposures. Moreover, as long as the proportions ω1, . . . , ωn and the
riskiness of the capital returns X1, . . . ,Xn remain constant, the instability of both func-
tional expressions depends alone on the instability of the expectations firmly maintained
by individuals, and not on whether individuals agree or not on these expectations. Hence
the difference between the homogeneous and the non-homogeneous expectations settings
is not relevant in explaining the instability of the money demand of the economy.11
Endowed with an expression for the aggregate liquidity-preference of the economy, we
can now proceed to characterise the monetary equilibrium when individuals determine
their cash holdings according to the optimal liquidity principle defined in Equation 9.
5 The Monetary Equilibrium with the Optimal Liquidity
Principle
Replacing Equation 11 into Equation 2, we obtain that in the case of homogeneous ex-
pectations the monetary equilibrium is determined by the following equation:
M = Y · λ(r) = Y · T−1θ,−Xc(r) = Y · T−1−Xc
(
rθ
)
(13)
where M denotes the total stock of money in the economy. Hence both the riskiness of
national income (determined by the random variable Xc) and the market expectations
(characterised by the informational type θ) explicitly affect the monetary equilibrium.
This means, in particular, that the monetary policy choosen by the central bank is not
corresponded to a unique level of the interest rate, as obtained from Equation 2. In fact,
given any money stock M , multiple interest rates satisfy Equation 13, depending on the
probability distribution describing the riskiness of national income and the informational
type θ corresponded to the market expectations.
It is also worth noticing that, though strictly speaking the informational parameter θ
modifies the probability distribution of the underlying risk, it is the cost of capital what
is ultimately affected when the distortion transformation of Equation 4 is implemented.
Thus the rate rθ represents a corrected or anticipated interest rate.
Since the 1970s, economists have stressed the role of expectations in the determination
of prices and interest rates. In fact, according to the rational expectations hypothesis,
11This conclusion contradicts the Keynes’s argument, that the money demand of the economy must be
absolute (and so, that monetary policy is useless) in the case of homogeneous expectations (see Keynes,
1937a and 1937b). As explained later in Section 7, the preference for liquidity can indeed be absolute
under certain circumstances, but as a consequence of the riskiness of national income.
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the expectations of individuals reflect long term fundamentals in the average — or in
other words, long term prices and interest rates are good predictors of future short term
prices and interest rates. Within this context, interest rates fluctuations are exclusively
determined by changes in expectations in the average.12
As stated in Equation 13, expectations do indeed affect the monetary equilibrium
when the preference for liquidity of the economy is characterised by the optimal liquidity
principle. As a matter of fact, since the cost of capital is under-estimated in averse-to-
risk economies (characterised by θ > 1), the interest rate attained at equilibrium in this
case is always greater than the levels attained in risk neutral and risk-lover economies
(respectively characterised by θ = 1 and θ < 1) for the same money supply M and the
same aggregate exposure Xc. On the other hand, the level of interest rates attained at
equilibrium in risk-lover economies is always lower than the levels attained in risk neutral
and averse-to-risk economies, because risk-lover individuals systematically over-estimate
the cost of capital.
When the probability function describing the random variable Xc is defined by some
analytical expression, the influence of the uncertainty of the national output on the mone-
tary equilibrium can be explicitly described in terms of the underlying risk parameters. A
careful examination of the model under the different families of probability distributions
found in the statistical literature is out of the scope of this paper. Instead, the case of the
Gaussian distribution will be examined in the following section. Later in Section 7, an
extended theoretical framework for the conduction of monetary policy will be presented,
based on the fact that the elasticity of the preference for liquidity with respect to the
interest rate explicitly depends on the mean return and the volatility of the aggregate
exposure Xc when the Gaussian liquidity principle is introduced.
6 The Gaussian Liquidity Principle
In the particular case when the aggregate percentage return X is represented by a Gaus-
sian probability distribution with mean return µ and volatility σ, the optimal liquidity
principle is given by the following expression (see Equation 9):
λµ,σ(r
θ) = σ · Φ−1
(
1− rθ
)
− µ (14)
where Φ denotes the cumulative probability distribution of a standard Gaussian random
variable, whose mean and volatility are respectively equal to zero and one (see e.g. De
Finetti, 1975, and also Dhaene et al., 2002):
Φ(x) =
1√
2pi
·
∫ x
−∞
exp
(−y2
2
)
dy ∀x
12Keynes (1936, 1937a and 1937b) states that the preference for liquidity is actually determined by
the level of the interest rate expected to prevail in the long run. See Equation (8) in Friedman, 1970,
and the related discussion. The formulation of the rational expectations hypothesis, and its application
to macroeconomic analysis, are due to Robert Lucas (1969, 1972, 1980 and 1996) and Thomas Sargent
(1972, 1973 and 1976).
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The (first order) derivative of the Gaussian liquidity principle with respect to the interest
rate is then equal to:
dλµ,σ(r
θ)
dr
= −
√
2pi σ · θ rθ−1 · exp
(
[Φ−1
(
1− rθ)]2
2
)
≤ 0 ∀ r, θ, µ, σ (15)
Therefore, the Gaussian liquidity principle always follows a decreasing and continuous
path, independently of the levels of the risk parameters µ and σ and the informational
type θ. This implies that, for every fixed level of income Y , the derived demand for
cash holdings L(r) = Y · λµ,σ(rθ) always follows a decreasing and continuous path and
consequently, that the derived money demand L(r) is well defined.
It can be easily verified that the sum of income returns preserves the Gaussian liq-
uidity principle. Indeed, consider a series of Gaussian exposures X1, . . . ,Xn with means
µ1, . . . , µn and volatilities σ1, . . . , σn. Let the individual and aggregate income levels be
respectively denoted by Y1, . . . , Yn and Y , with Y = Y1 + · · · + Yn. Replacing the liq-
uidity principles λ1(r
θ), . . . , λn(r
θ) according to Equation 14, we obtain that the optimal
individual cash balances are given by:
Li(r) = Yi · λi(rθ) = Yi ·
[
σi Φ
−1
(
1− rθ
)
− µi
]
∀i = 1, . . . , n
and summing up the individual cash contributions, the following expression is obtained
for the aggregate cash balance:
L(r) =
n∑
i=1
Li(r) = Y ·
n∑
i=1
ωi · [ σi Φ−1
(
1− rθ
)
− µi ] with ωi = Yi
Y
∀i
Hence the aggregate Gaussian liquidity principle is equal to the optimal liquidity principle
related to a Gaussian exposure whose mean and volatility are respectively given by the
weighted average means and volatilities:
µ =
n∑
i=1
ωi · µi and σ =
n∑
i=1
ωi · σi (16)
Dhaene et al. (2002) actually demonstrate that the comonotonic sum of Gaussian random
variables is also a Gaussian random variable, whose mean return and volatility are defined
as in Equation 16. Then the aggregation of the Gaussian liquidity principle according to
Equations 14 and 16 is consistent with the condition established in Equation 10.
Recall that (as already pointed out in Section 1) a central question for the design of
monetary policy is how monetary interventions affect the equilibrium interest rate in the
short-run. Such effect is explicitly measured by the point elasticity of the money demand
with respect to the interest rate, a coefficient defined as the percentage variation in the
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proportion of demanded balances with respect to one percent variation of the interest rate.
From Equations 14 and 15, the following expression is obtained for the point elasticity of
the Gaussian liquidity principle:
ξ =
r
λµ,σ(rθ)
· dλµ,σ(r
θ)
dr
=
−√2pi · θ rθ
Φ−1(1− rθ)− µ
σ
· exp
(
[Φ−1
(
1− rθ)]2
2
)
(17)
The point interest rate elasticity is thereby expressed as a function of the corrected or
expected interest rate rθ and the mean-to-volatility ratio µ/σ:
ξθ
(
r,
µ
σ
)
= θ · ξ
(
rθ,
µ
σ
)
with ξ
(
r,
µ
σ
)
=
r
λµ,σ(r)
· dλµ,σ(r)
dr
(18)
The functions ξ(r, µ/σ) and ξθ(r, µ/σ) can thus be respectively interpreted as neutral and
corrected point elasticity functions.
Let us examine the dependence of the neutral point elasticity on the interest rate and
the risk parameters — the analysis can be easily extended to incorporate the effects of
expectations, as stated in Equation 18.
Let us notice in the first place that the sign of the point elasticity is determined by the
level of the interest rate and the mean-to-volatility ratio, in such a way that:
ξ
(
r, µ
σ
)
< 0 ⇔ Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
> 0 ⇔ λµ,σ(r) > 0
ξ
(
r, µ
σ
)
> 0 ⇔ Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
< 0 ⇔ λµ,σ(r) < 0
In fact, when µ < σ · Φ−1(1− r) the benefit provided by the expected return µ does not
suffice to compensate for the variation σ · Φ−1(1 − r) and hence an additional balance
must be supplied to avoid default. By contrast, when µ > σ · Φ−1(1 − r), individuals
own cash in excess of what is needed to protect them from bankruptcy. They accordingly
prefer to lend their surpluses at the interest rate r in this case.
Secondly, the limiting behaviour of the elasticity function ξ(r, µ/σ) provides theoretical
evidence that the economy can actually attain states characterised both by absolute and
non-absolute liquidity-preference.
Indeed, notice that although the elasticity of the money demand is less than infinite
for a wide range of values of the interest rate, it converges to infinite when the interest
rate approaches to any of the limiting cases r = 0 and r = 1:
ξ
(
r, µ
σ
) ↓ −∞ when r ↓ 0
ξ
(
r, µ
σ
) ↑ +∞ when r ↑ 1 (19)
Hence the money demand becomes perfectly elastic when the interest rate approaches to
any of the limiting cases r = 0 and r = 1.
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More remarkable is the fact that the money demand becomes perfectly elastic at a
certain value of the interest rate belonging to the interior of the interval (0, 1). In fact,
it can be easily verified from Equations 17 and 18 that for any fixed level of the interest
rate:
|Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
| ↑ +∞ and |Φ−1(1− r)| < +∞ =⇒ ∣∣ξ (r, µ
σ
)∣∣ ↓ 0
|Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
| ↓ 0 or |Φ−1(1− r)| ↑ +∞ =⇒
∣∣ξ (r, µ
σ
)∣∣ ↑ +∞ (20)
Therefore, the point elasticity of the Gaussian liquidity principle is undefined at the
point where Φ−1(1 − r) = µ/σ, because it converges to magnitudes with opposite signs
depending on whether the term Φ−1(1 − r) − µ/σ approaches to zero from the right or
from the left:
ξ
(
r, µ
σ
) ↓ −∞ when Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
↓ 0
ξ
(
r, µ
σ
) ↑ +∞ when Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
↑ 0
(21)
On these grounds, we can say that the condition Φ−1(1− r) = µ/σ determines a critical
point, for liquidity-preference becomes absolute (and monetary policy becomes useless)
under such circumstances.
7 Extended Monetary Policy
Consider some economy that produces the income percentage return X = ∆Y/Y , where
Y denotes the level of national income. Let us additionally assume that the return
X is distributed as a Gaussian random variable with mean µ and volatility σ, and let
the parameter θ denote the informational state of the public in the economy. Then
the functions λµ,σ(r
θ) (defined in Equation 14) and Lµ,σ(r) = Y · λµ,σ(rθ) respectively
determine the aggregate preference for liquidity and the optimal balance demanded at
the aggregate level, which, at equilibrium, must equalise the total stock of money M
supplied by the monetary authority:
M = Y · λµ,σ(rθ) = P y ·
[
σ Φ−1
(
1− rθ
)
− µ
]
(22)
where, as in Equation 2, the variables P and y respectively denote the levels of prices
and real income. Accordingly, variations in the amount of money M must be followed
by changes in any of the variables P , y, rθ, µ and σ in order to reestablish the monetary
equilibrium.
Since the monetary equilibrium is explicitly affected by the risk parameters µ and σ
in Equation 22, the alternative model of equilibrium can be regarded as an extension to
the classic model described by Equation 2. It will be accordingly known as the extended
model in the following.
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Let us now investigate how the monetary equilibrium is established in the short-run in
the extended model. More precisely, we would like to know how the level of the interest
rate adjusts in the short-run in response to a certain variation ∆M in the money stock,
assuming that the informational type θ and the risk parameters µ, σ remain unchanged.
Applying differences to Equation 22 we actually obtain that:
∆M
M
= pi + ρ+
∆λµ,σ(r
θ)
λµ,σ(rθ)
with pi :=
∆P
P
and ρ :=
∆y
y
where pi denotes the rate of inflation, equal to the percentage variation in the level of
prices, and ρ denotes the growth rate of the economy, equal to the percentage variation in
the level of real output. From Equations 14, 17 and 18, the following equivalent expression
is obtained:
∆M
M
= pi + ρ+
θ
r
ξ
(
rθ,
µ
σ
)
·∆r (23)
Therefore, given fixed rates of inflation and economic growth (pi, ρ), and given fixed levels
of expectations and risk parameters (θ, µ, σ), every trend of monetary growth ∆M/M is
corresponded to a unique movement of the interest rate ∆r.
Within this context, monetary authorities can always provide the amount of money
that is compatible with a certain target inflation level, provided that they tolerate the
necessary adjustment of interest rates — and provided that the productivity rate of the
economy, as well as the informational and risk parameters, remain unchanged.
The extent to which monetary interventions are compensated by interest rate adjust-
ments depends, however, on the factor |(θ/r)· ξ(rθ, µ/σ)|, which defines the semi-elasticiy
function of the money demand:
ηθ
(
r,
µ
σ
)
= θ · η
(
rθ,
µ
σ
)
with η
(
r,
µ
σ
)
=
1
r
· ξ
(
r,
µ
σ
)
(24)
Then the lower the semi-elasticity, the less the demand for balances is affected by a point
of variation of the interest rate and hence, the more the levels of prices and real output
are adjusted in Equation 23 to compensate for any given change in the money stock. In
the limit when |ηθ(r, µ/σ)| → 0, the whole effect is transmitted to the levels of prices and
real output. By contrast, the greater the semi-elasticity, the more the variations in the
money stock are explained by means of changes in the liquidity-preference of individuals.
In the limit when |ηθ(r, µ/σ)| → ∞, every change in the stock of money is followed by a
variation of equal magnitude but opposite sign in the balances demanded by the economy,
for in this case individuals modify their cash holdings in order to maintain unaltered the
level of the interest rate — the only level they agree to pay for borrowing.
Notice that the dependence of the semi-elasticity with respect to the risk parameters
is contingent upon the state of the economy. In fact, in some cases the semi-elasticity
is diminished both by increasing the magnitude of the expected output return and by
reducing the output volatility:
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|µ| ↑ or σ ↓ =⇒
∣∣∣Φ−1 (1− rθ)− µ
σ
∣∣∣ ↑ =⇒ ∣∣∣ηθ (r, µ
σ
)∣∣∣ ↓

 if µσ < Φ−1
(
1− rθ) < 0
or 0 < Φ−1
(
1− rθ) < µ
σ


Accordingly, there are certain scenarios when the efficacy of the monetary mechanism is
increased both by augmenting the expected output return and by reducing the variability
of output. But this dependence is inverted in the complementary case:
|µ| ↑ or σ ↓ =⇒
∣∣∣Φ−1 (1− rθ)− µ
σ
∣∣∣ ↓ =⇒ ∣∣∣ηθ (r, µ
σ
)∣∣∣ ↑

 if Φ−1
(
1− rθ) < µ
σ
< 0
or 0 < µ
σ
< Φ−1
(
1− rθ)


This means that there is also a set of combinations of the risk parameters and the corrected
interest rate corresponded to states of the economy where the conduction of monetary
policy is favoured both by increasing volatility and decreasing expected gains.
Regarding the limiting behaviour of the semi-elasticity function, it can be easily verified
that:
r ↓ 0 or r ↑ 1 =⇒
∣∣∣ηθ (r, µ
σ
)∣∣∣→ +∞
Besides (and most notably), the semi-elasticity is equal to infinite in the particular case
when rθ = 1− Φ(µ/σ):
rθ = 1− Φ
(µ
σ
)
=⇒ Φ−1(1− rθ)− µ
σ
= 0 =⇒
∣∣∣ηθ (r, µ
σ
)∣∣∣ =∞
Consequently, there is a set of states where the preference for liquidity of the economy is
absolute, which are corresponded to critical states of the economy.
In conclusion, both absolute and non-absolute liquidity-preference scenarios are pos-
sible in the extended model. This means that the assumption traditionally supported
by researchers and policy makers, namely, that money and interest rate adjustments are
related to each other according to a linear schedule — and hence, that monetary author-
ities can effectively stimulates the economy by controlling the aggregate money supply
— does not necessarily hold in the extended model.
We must then conclude that trying to induce some rates of inflation and economic
growth by purely controlling the money supply might be more difficult than expected by
researchers and central bankers nowadays. Indeed, as long as monetary interventions are
likely to produce variations in the level of nominal output, the preference for liquidity
of the economy might be affected as well if such variations induce modifications in the
statistical description of the series of output returns.
The meaning of the previous statement can be better understood by considering the
following equivalent formulation of Equation 23:
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∆M
M
−X = ηθ

r , E[X]√
E
[
(X −E[X])2
]

 ·∆r with X = ∆YY (25)
Two different effects of monetary interventions are clearly distinguished in Equation 25.
Firstly, there is a net effect induced by the simultaneous actions of monetary authorities
and the general public — which appears to the left-hand side of Equation 25 — equal
to the percentage variation of the money stock minus the percentage output return.
Secondly, there is a response of the economy as an aggregate unit, implemented as changes
in the levels of expectations and interest rates, as well as in the expected value and the
standard deviation of the series of output returns — which appears to the right-hand side
of Equation 25.
A clear economic interpretation can be given to this result. Indeed, notice that from
Equation 2 the liquidity-preference factor λ(r) represents the amount of monetary units
that are exchanged by a unit of output in the economy, i.e. it represents the price of a
unit of national output. According to basic economic theory, modifying the availability
of some good with respect to another implies that the relative price of any of these goods
with respect to the other is necessarily altered. Hence modifying the supply of money
implies that the preference for liquidity (i.e. the relative price of the national output with
respect to money) must be necessarily adjusted.
From the actuarial point of view, the price of any contingent claim must strictly depend
on the exposition to risk. Since in a Gaussian setting the exposition to risk is completely
characterised by the expected return and the volatility of the underlying claim, variations
in the price of risk are corresponded to changes in these parameters.
We then arrive to the main conclusion that monetary policy should not exclusively
focus on inflation and growth, but also on the statistical evolution (as determined by the
expected return and the volatility) of the series of percentage returns of the nominal
output.
In other words, in order to ensure sustainable growth and financial stability, monetary
authorities must necessarily pay attention to nominal fluctuations, which might certainly
appear as the result of discretionary monetary interventions, but which might be also in-
duced by flows of capital supplied by private investors. This point is particularly relevant
in the case of open economies, specially when exposed to oil or other commodity prices.
As it is well known, inflation targeting policies are likely to perform poorly under such
circumstances, since then inflation is a bad estimator of the rate of growth of the money
supply.
8 Conclusions
An alternative approach is presented in this paper for the characterisation of the money
demand in economies where individuals face borrowing restrictions when raising funds in
capital markets and the series of percentage returns of the national income follows the
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path of a random variable. The approach is based on the model of liquidity-preference of
James Tobin (1958), who proposes to relate the demand for money to the maximisation
of the utility provided by some portfolio combining risk and cash holdings. Unlike the
model of Tobin, in this paper the optimal balance is determined in order to minimise
the price of insuring the net portfolio plus the opportunity cost of capital — for deposit
insurance is the only substitute to hedging in the presence of borrowing restrictions.
As a result, the (optimal) money demand explicitly depends on the statistical descrip-
tion of the series of output returns. In a Gaussian setting, this implies that the monetary
equilibrium is explicitly determined by the mean return and the volatility of the series of
output returns.
Consequently, in the alternative model the money stock supplied by central banks
is not corresponded to a unique level of the interest rate, as it is assumed in classic
macroeconomics analysis — and supported by most of researchers and policy-makers
nowadays. Then monetary interventions are not likely to exclusively affect the level of
the interest rate, but also the mean return and the volatility of the series of output returns.
In fact, the extent to which monetary interventions affect the level of the interest rate
can be precisely stated in the extended model, for an explicit expression is obtained in
this setting for the point interest rate elasticity of the money demand. According to this
expression, the elasticity of the money demand can be equal to any value between minus
one and one, depending on the levels of the interest rate and the pair of expected return
and volatility of the series of output returns. Hence, in particular, the extreme cases of
perfect elasticity and perfect inelasticity are both possible in the extended model. Besides,
if the mean return and the volatility of the series of output returns evolve in time, so
does the elasticity of the money demand.
This means that the economy can transit from states where monetary policy can ef-
fectively stimulate the economy (characterised by a non-elastic money demand) to states
(characterised by a perfectly elastic money demand) where changes in the amount of
money are completely absorbed by adjustments in the preference for liquidity and have
no effect on the real side of the economy. Thus the so-called monetary controversy — i.e.
the debate on the elasticity of the money demand — which has divided specialists between
supporters of fiscal and monetary policy, is rather pointless in the extended model.
We then arrive to the major conclusion derived from the alternative model of equilib-
rium proposed in this paper, i.e. that nominal fluctuations matter, regardless of whether
they are induced by discretionary (or irresponsible) monetary interventions or by the will
of consumers and private investors. More precisely, we are forced to conclude that plan-
ning sound monetary policy (promoting rapid and sustainable economic growth) requires
that, in addition to growth and inflation rates, the mean return and the volatility of the
series of nominal output returns have to be incorporated into the design.
This result establishes a fundamental disagreement with the conceptual framework
accepted by most of central bankers nowadays, who tend to exclusively concentrate on
the level of prices and inflation. On these grounds, consumption fluctuations are regarded
as undesirable, as long as they can put a pressure on the level of prices and lead to a
departure of the inflation rate from its target level, although increasing investment flows
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are normally considered as beneficial.
At the centre of the divergence between the classic and the extended approach, there
is a disagreement about the meaning and the characterisation of inflation. In classic
macroeconomics, inflation is simply defined as the rate of growth of the level of prices
in the economy, although from a broader (and rather functional) perspective, what this
coefficient intends to measure is the result of affecting the purchasing power of consumers.
Indeed, if the level of nominal output follows a steady path of growth — only affected by
negligible fluctuations — and if the level of real output remains more or less unchanged,
then it is only the level of prices what can modify people’s economic decisions.
In the extended model, on the other hand, the purchasing power of individuals is mea-
sured by the liquidity-preference factor λ(r), for this coefficient explicitly determines the
price (in monetary units) of a unit of nominal income — i.e. it explicitly indicates how
many monetary units are needed to exchange a unit of nominal income, see Equation 2.
The preference for liquidity is additionally corresponded to a portfolio problem, where
money is regarded as a storage of wealth that prevents its holders from suffering the losses
derived from (random) nominal fluctuations. This implies that it is the whole statistical
description of the series of nominal output returns what affects the people’s purchasing
power in the extended model.
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